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LUCA OBERTELLO
The image of God in the human person is to be found,
according to St. Augustine, in the "highest part" of the human mind,
to which he reserves the name mens.ι "One's mind [mens]," he says, "is
not of the same nature as God. Nevertheless the image of that nature
which transcends all others must be searched for and found in us, in
i. Mens is the superior part of the rational soul. Animus or anima is the vital
principle that gives life to the body (De Tήnitate 4.1.3). The human soul shares with
other souls a capacity for sensible knowledge and a certain degree of consciousness
(8.6.9) but is distinguished from animal souls as substantia spiήtualis (12.1.1 [CCL
50:356.17-18]). The human mind is the seat of knowledge, memory, and imagina-
tion. Mind embraces reason and intelligence ("mens, cui ratio et intelligentia natu-
raliter inest," De civ. Dei 11.2 [CCL 48:322.21]). It adheres to the intelligibles and to
God (see Enarr. in Psalmos 3.3; De diver, quaest. 83 7). In some passages, mens is
identified with animus (e.g., De Trin. 15.1.1: "quae mens vocatur vel animus" [CCL
50A:460.6]), but Augustine generally considers it as the "caput [anίmae] vel oculus
vel fades" (15.7.11 [50A:475.11-12]). While Plotinus distinguished between psyche
and nous and regarded them as two hypostases, the one deriving from the other
through emanation, Augustine firmly maintains the unity of the soul. It is the same
spiritual principle, he maintains, that in turn perceives, animates the body, imagines,
reasons, and intuitively knows the eternal truths. There is thus considerable warrant
for rendering mens as "soul" in modern English, but I shall usually retain a distinction
between "mind" and "soul" in order to remind readers of Augustine's distinction
between mens and animus.
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that than which our nature has nothing better."2 This does not mean,
of course, that the Trinity can be demonstrated from created things,
even the highest of them—such as the human mind. It does mean
that a hint, an echo, a reflection can be traced from some creatures to
the most perfect nature, and that this tracing in some way brings the
very notion of the divine nearer to us.3
Despite some loose, or even ambiguous, passages, a central thesis in
Augustine is that the human being was created in the likeness of the
creator, "not according to the body nor to any part of the soul, but to
the rational mind [rationalis mem], where alone there can be acquain-
tance [agnitio] of God."4 It is certainly plausible that only the rational
mind should have knowledge of God, and that such knowledge should
not be had by the body or the lower parts of the soul (which are in
touch with what is sensible and so participate in the sensible^ blind-
ness towards what is spiritual). But this plausibility does not seem to
justify the conclusion that the image of God is present only in the
highest part of the soul.
It might indeed seem more logical to think that God, in creating
the human person, should have impressed on the whole being, both
body and soul, both sensibility and rationality, God's own mysterious
image. God's self-exhortation in Genesis, "Let us make humanity in
our image and likeness," cannot be readily translated as, "Let us make
the human soul in our image and likeness." It would seem that this
restrictive translation should be rejected not just because "Moses" (or
the first author of Genesis) had no knowledge of Platonic thought but,
more radically, because the creative action of God relates to global
entities, to the totality of beings and not to their constituent ele-
ments, however high and embracing.
2. De Tήn. 14.8.11 (CCL 50A:436.4-7). Compare 12.7.12, in which some texts
from St. Paul are brought forward in support of this thesis, not without a bit of forcing.
A parallel passage (14.3.6) says, "There ought to be found in man's soul, namely in
reason and intellect, that image of the Creator which is immortality inscribed in its
immortality" (CCL 50A:428.62-63). Here the immortality of the soul must be under-
stood in the sense that "in every condition of life, even the most miserable, the soul
never ceases to live. In the same way, although reason and intelligence may now
appear to be quenched in it, now small and now great, the human soul is never other
than rational and intellectual" (50A:428.4-8).
3. For instance, De civ. Dei 11.26. As it is easy to see in this passage, Augustine
implies that the whole human person is the image of the Trinity.
4. DeTήn. 12.7.12 (CCL50:336.82-84).
AUGUSTINE ON ORIGINAL PERCEPTION 3
In answering this objection, which explicitly opposes the meta-
physics of the Bible to that of Plato and the Neoplatonists, we do
indeed have to resort to a Neoplatonic doctrine that carries a particu-
lar theoretical weight and that had an extensive historical diffusion.5
In De libero arbitήo 2, in his discussion with Evodius, Augustine estab-
lishes three basic levels: the level of being (esse), of living (vivere), and
of thinking (inteϊligere).6 He asks Evodius, "Which of these three
seems to you superior to the others?" Evodius answers, "Intelligence."
Augustine asks, "Why do you think so?" Evodius's response is syn-
thetic and articulate, providing a compendium of the Neoplatonic
point of view. These are his words:
These things are three: being, living, thinking. A stone exists, and a beast
lives, but I do not think that a stone lives or a beast thinks. It is most
certain, however, that one who thinks both exists and lives. So I have no
doubt in judging more excellent that being in which all these states are
present than the being that is wanting one or another of them.
The three basic qualities of reality, of every possible reality, interact
with each other in a way that I would call telescopic. I mean that the
one inheres in, or leads to, the other, in a scale from pure nothingness
to that most complex and integrated reality which is the human being.
Evodius thus proposes a synthetic, but quite precise, vindication of the
superiority of the subject in which all these qualities are simultane-
ously present. In this subject itself, again, the relative superiority of
thought is established so far as it "implies, in those who possess it,
being and living."
It is important to observe that the superiority of thought over the
other qualities or states is justified, not on the grounds of its specific
excellence over living and being, but rather because the presence of
thought indicates the fullness of the being to which it belongs.
5. Two examples must suffice. Proclus gives the principle a place of importance in
his philosophical teaching. See, e.g., Elements of Theology theor. 101-103, 138, and
198; and Platonic Theology 3.9, edited by Saffrey and Westerink (Paris, 1978) 35.19-
24. And Michael Psellus, in the eleventh century, proposes exactly the same distinc-
tion between being, living, and thinking that we are about to state, stressing the
excellence of thought as summing up the other qualities or levels of reality. See, e.g.,
the third opusculum in Westerink ed., De omnifaria doctήna (Nijmegen, 1948)
105.18-24.
6. De lib. arb. 2.3.7.21-22 (CCL 29:240.18-25), from which the immediately
following quotations are also taken.
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Thought is excellent because it is the sign and proof of a fullness, not
because it in itself is a sufficient fullness. Thought is the embracing
principle for the whole of the present world, in which all lower
beings—the inanimate and the animate but unintelligent—are held
together and transcended.
As thought brings together being and living, so we can assume that
the mind is the synthesis (not only potentially, but also actually) of
all the qualities that are scattered in the present world. It is only nat-
ural, then, that the likeness to the world's creator should be sought in
it, a likeness recorded as image or imprint in the beings called to exis-
tence by God. Another central theme of the Augustinian vision, in
many ways dependent on Neoplatonic theories about the mind's self-
knowledge, casts even more light upon this important speculative
principle of hierarchical inclusiveness.
Augustine maintains that we do not perceive our being, our know-
ing, and the love that unites us to both of them,
with any bodily sense, as we perceive things outside: colors by seeing,
sounds by hearing, odors by smelling, flavors by tasting, hard things and
soft by touching. Rather we treat images of these sensible things—images
very similar to them, but no longer bodily—by thought, retain them by
memory, and by their means are solicited to desire them. But my being,
my knowing, my loving is most certain to me, not with any images or
visions of a deceitful imagination, but certain and free from the deceptions
of an imagination.7
But how do we perceive these interior realities or subjective facts?
Do we perceive them through "reason" or whatever else we may wish
to call the higher faculty of the human soul? Augustine does not
say or suggest that the original human certainties are known by means
of reason alone. All of his arguments, on the contrary, stress that the
certainties in question here are immediate, self-evident, indispu-
table—that they carry in themselves their own foundation and final
verification.
According to Augustine every act of existence is self-assertive. The
skeptics of the Academy may object: But what if you are mistaken in
this foundational certainty of yours? What if you do not exist, while
believing that you do exist? After all, you know that your faculties
deceive you and make you take one thing for another. To them,
7. De civ. Dei 11.26 (CCL 48:345.9-17).
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Augustine replies simply, "If I am mistaken, I am."8 The basic cer-
tainty about the self's existence is unshakable and inconfutable. An-
other Augustinian formulation of the same principle is perhaps even
more effective:
If you do not discern what I am saying and doubt whether it is true, discern
at least whether you doubt about whether you are doubting these things. If
it is certain for you that you are doubting, then ask how it is certain. The
light of no other sun will appear to you there but the true light that shines
upon every human being who comes into this world.9
Some may argue, says Augustine, that the certainty of their and my
existence is groundless and erroneous, and that I in fact do not exist
even while I am sure of existing. But to be sure (even erroneously) of
existing, I must exist.10 In a more general form, we could say, "Every
being that acts in a certain way, even erroneously, must exist in order
to act." In the hands of Augustine, who fully exploits its dialectical,
rhetorical, and existential aspects, the argument from doubt becomes
a refined demonstration of the vacuity of objections that have been,
and still are, made against humanity's basic certainties, the certainties
of being, living, knowing, wanting, loving.11 These certainties do not
need any additional check before being accepted. Their validity is
absolute and indisputable in itself, as the Augustinian argument makes
decisively clear.12
8. De civ. Dei 11.26 (CCL 48:345.18), to which compare the ample, important
passage in De Tήn. 15.12.21.
o. De vera relig. 39.73 (CCL 32:234.25-235.30), with the allusion to John 1.9.
10. Compare the accurate analysis in Bruce Bubacz, St. Augustine's Theory of
Knowledge: A Contemporary Analysis (New York: E. Mellen, 1981), pp. 39-55.
11. See De Trin. 10.10.13-14, particularly 10.10.14.
12. A pregnant passage in the dialogue between Augustine and Evodius states the
problem clearly (De lib. ark 2.3.7.20 [CCL 29:239.6-240.10). Augustine addresses
Evodius: "In first place I ask you . . . whether you exist. Do you perhaps fear to be led
into error by this request? But, certainly, if you did not exist, you could not be
mistaken in any way." Evodius simply answers, "Proceed to other problems . . . ," as
if to say that Augustine's considerations are obvious. But the reading required by such
a text, as by De civitate Dei and De Tήnitate, is very different from the pragmatistic
reading by Bubacz. He likens Augustine's teaching in one passage to a "cognitive
Darwinism" (St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge, p. 218). But in place of a fortuitous
outcome of interactions between experience and the world, Augustine offers a theory
of the soul and its knowledge based on the naturalness of consciousness, that is, on the
facts that its testimony is anterior to any other and that the ensuing certainty is
indisputable.
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The same certainty that presides over the self-assertion of being
presides over knowing and loving and whatever other states may be
singled out as belonging to the original human self-experience. In
every case, it is a question of immediate perceptions that cannot be
contradicted. Together these make up the ontological "platform" of
human nature, which Augustine identifies with the mind. The knowl-
edge of minds, our own and those of others, is connatural and imme-
diate to us.
We love the Apostle Paul, Augustine says, when we get to know
him by reading his letters. We make for ourselves a sensible image of
him in imagination. This image differs from reader to reader and is
always different from the Apostle's true visage. But that is not what
really matters to us. What matters is to know that Paul participated in
our human nature. We do not know what his actual features were,
even when we try to imagine them. But we know what a human being
is because we ourselves are human. "We do of course believe about
him what we know of ourselves in species and genus," that is, accord-
ing to the logico-metaphysical definitions of human nature elaborated
in the ancient philosophies. But there is a kind of knowledge even
more natural and original than that. We love the mind of Paul, not
because we have recourse to the conceptual instruments of genus and
species, but because we "know" what a mind is.
And we do not say inappropriately that we know what a soul is, since we
too have a soul. We do not see the soul at all with our eyes, nor create for
ourselves a notion of soul according to genus or species by comparing many
of them as seen by us, but we know it rather . . . because we too have a
soul. What is so intimately known, and perceives its own existence [seque
ipsum esse senύt\y as that by means of which all other things are perceived,
the soul itself?13
Augustine's punctuating question, which is less rhetorical than
philosophical, suggests briefly what the following passage of De Ύήni-
tate gradually unfolds. In order to understand it, one false impression
must be set aside at once. It might seem obvious to a modern reader
that when Augustine speaks of the souΓs knowledge of itself and of
other similar souls, he must be speaking of an evidential knowledge.
But the "intimate knowledge" that he is describing is in truth a sort of
perception or apprehension. In fact, in Augustine's language it is
13. De Trin. 8.6.9 (CCL 50:279.9-15).
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always joined, as in a hendiadys, to the "perception of its own exis-
tence." This fundamental complementarity is taken up again and
again, being explained and specified by the whole context.
All animals, both rational and irrational, partake of a natural and
spontaneous advertence to the vital principle that animates other
living beings. There is a perception of likenesses between the move-
ments of our body and those of others. In fact, we move our bodies in
ways that we see other bodies move. We might imagine that when
another living body moves, an interior channel or "window" (different
from the sensible faculty, though naturally involving it) opens for the
living observer, who feels that in the body that he or she perceives
there is something similar to what moves his or her own body, namely,
life and soul.
This perceiving faculty, interior and exterior as it is, and exterior
insofar as it is interior, is a common endowment of all animals. It
consists in perceiving the act of being and living both of oneself and of
others. One does not see the other's soul but, rather, is led back from
exterior movements to the transcendent principle that gives rise to
them. Such a principle is not articulated with rational clearness and
distinctness, but is perceived immediately and "with utmost ease by
means of a natural affinity" ("statim et facillime quadam conspiratione
naturali"). And not only do we "perceive" the souls of other people by
analogy with our own, but we can also know what they are by con-
sidering our own soul.14
Such are the naturalness and immediacy of this inner act of percep-
tion, and so great is its difference from formal and explicit thinking,
that it may well escape our attention and lie hidden in our minds.
There are dimensions of knowledge ignored by the mind itself, in the
sense that they are present in it but obscure and not made evident in
the light of actual consciousness. Augustine asks himself, How is this
possible? "What do we know, in fact, if we do not know what is in our
own minds, since we can know all that we know only by means of our
mind?"15
The specific power of thought is so great that the mind itself,
through which all that is being thought is thought, could not face
14. See, again, De Tήn. 8.6.9 (CCL 50:280.25-30), here paraphrased.
15. De Tήn. 14-6.8 (CCL 50A:430.29-31), from which the immediately follow-
ing quotations are also taken (431.5—8 and so on).
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itself with itself in any other way than by thinking itself. "How the
soul is not in its vision [conspectus] when it does not think itself—
since it can never be separated from itself, as if it were both itself and
the vision of itself—this I cannot discover."16 Augustine here asks
himself how it could happen that the mind should not have a cogni-
tive vision, a full apperception of itself, except when in the act of
thinking. That may cause some astonishment, because everything in
the mind is unitary, and the mind's "vision" or "sight" is not different
from the mind itself.
The most immediate answer, which is also the most incorrect,
supposes that the mind sees a part of itself with another part, that an
"active" or "actualized" part of the mind sees others that are "passive."
Augustine objects:
Can anything more absurd than that this be thought or said? From where
is the mind brought out, if not from itself? And where is it put in its own
vision, if not in front of itself? It was not where it was, then, when it was
not in its own vision, because if it has been put here, then it has been
removed from there. But if it has to be moved to be seen, where shall it
stay to see itself? Or does it come to be twinned in some way, so that it is
here and there—here to see, there to be seen—in itself contemplating, in
front of itself contemplated?17
Whoever thinks in this way, thinks according to material imagery.
Yet the mind is not a material thing but an incorporeal reality. There
is nothing to be said, at least in principle and in view of the mind's
kind, except that "it belongs to the nature of the mind to have sight of
itself [conspectus eius]. When it conceives itself, it turns to its own
nature, not as if by a spatial passage, but with an incorporeal turning."
But what happens, then, when the mind does not explicitly and
actually conceive itself? At such times, which are frequent, the mind
does not see itself and is not present to its own sight, but even so it
"knows itself as if it were its own memory for itself" ("tanquam ipsa
sibi sit memoria sui"). Augustine adds a concrete example: it is like
what happens to one who knows many things. What such a person
16. The difficulty is real, and it points clearly to a limit on the Augustinian
doctrine about the will, a limit that can be overcome only through a rethinking of
body^soul dualism.
17. De Tήn. 14.6.8 (CCL 50A:431.18-24).
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knows is placed "in arcana quadam notitia," that is, in a hidden
knowledge called memory.
This example, like every other, holds only so far. Memory is notitia
not only of images, notions, or ideas held in the mind and stored there
but also of the mind's intimate reality, of its pure and essential being.
As such, memory is the backdrop, so to speak, for the appearance or
manifestation of the mind to itself, which constitutes the mind in
some functional way at least, because it is there that the mind lays its
own foundations. But while it is a manifestation, and the originating
manifestation, the memoria sui is also an arcana quaedam notitia, that
is, a hidden knowledge, mysterious and remote from the knowledge
that persists on the surface of explicit consciousness. With seeming
contradiction, we can say that memory is at once revelation and con-
cealment, knowledge and ignorance. Memory is that dawnlike contact
of the mind with itself and the world kept in itself, where everything
is present, but nothing is already explicated.
All this should tell us "that we have within ourselves, in the recess
of mind, some knowledges [notitiae] of things. And then, when they
are thought, they somehow come forth and place themselves as it were
more openly in the mind's vision. Then the mind itself finds that it
remembered, knew, and loved them even when it did not think them,
when it thought of other things."18 Emerging from the obscurity of the
original identification with itself, from the immediacy of perception
and the latency of memory, the mind moves towards an ever-growing
consciousness of itself and comes ever nearer to the measure of its own
specific perfection. At first it has, or better is, only memory of itself.
When it begins to think reflexively, it comes to have intelligence of
itself and to love itself as well.
With expressions that cannot fail to perplex by their strangeness to
the everyday, Augustine says, quite rhetorically: "Let the mind not
seek itself as if it were absent from itself. What is there, indeed, so
present to understanding [cognitio] as what is present to the mind? Or
what is so present to the mind, as the mind itself?"19 The mind, we
may conclude, must not leave itself in order to know and love itself. It
must remain in itself.
18. De Tήn. 14.7.9 (CCL 50A:433.19-434.24).
19. De Tήn. 10.7.10 (CCL 50:323.41-44), to which compare the analogous
expressions of 14.5.7.
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There are many possible alternative theses about the mind's inward
perception of itself, but none is very satisfactory. It might be that the
mind loves and desires to know itself by having conceived from exter-
nal opinions some ideas about itself and its desirability. Or it might be
that it makes up a mental representation similar to itself, so that in
order to reach itself it must first pass through notions about other
minds. Or, finally, it might be that it happens with mind as with
bodily eyes, which "know" other eyes better than themselves. But if
this is true, then the mind, seeking itself, will never find itself. "The
eyes in fact never see themselves without a mirror. Nor should one
ever think that such a thing might be used in the contemplation of
incorporeal things too, as if the soul could know itself in a minor."20
Unlike bodily eyes, which must become objects for themselves in
order to be able to see themselves, the mind must not go out from
itself if it will know itself.
The body's eyes see other eyes, not themselves. Whatever power it
is that enables them to see, we do not see that power through the eyes.
We see by means of the power, but precisely because of that we can-
not see it as such. It is the mind that allows us to understand that the
act of vision is accomplished through the intervention of a specific
power—and consequently the mind allows the sense of sight to be-
come conscious of itself, not as such, of course, but so far as it belongs
to the mind and is immersed in the mind's light of understanding.21
Augustine distinguishes three kinds of knowledge, to which there
correspond as many kinds of love. In doing so he once again takes over
and recreates Neoplatonic doctrine.22 If knowledge is inferior to what
20. DeTήn. 10.3.5 (CCL 50:317.15-18).
21. Following a complementary line of consideration, we can also say that if the
soul knows itself, it does not know itself as it knows the objects of ordinary expert
ence. Augustine states quite clearly that "if anyone says that the soul believes itself to
be like the other souls of which it has experience, on the grounds of a knowledge
[notitia] made up of genera and species, and that it loves itself in consequence, he
speaks most foolishly" (De Trin. 9.3.3 [CCL 50:290.2-5]).
22. The trichotomy of knowledge is clearly to be related to the doctrine about the
medietas of the soul between the intelligible and perceptible or sensible worlds. As is
well known, Plotinus teaches that the soul "occupies a middle rank [taxis] among the
things that exist, for while it shares in the divine, it also finds itself at the lowest point
of what is intelligible. In this way, bordering on perceptible nature, it gives to it
something of what it has in itself, and receives something in exchange" (Enneads
4.8.7 [Henry and Schwyzer 2:246.5-9]). That does not amount in any way to saying
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is known (which in itself is fully knowable), it is of course imperfect
knowledge. If it is superior, the knowing nature is superior to the
known. The knowledge that the mind has of the body, for example, is
superior to the body itself. But the mind, knowing itself, "does not
exceed itself with the knowledge [notitia] that it has of itself, since it
both understands and is understood [ipsa cognoscit, ipsa cognoscitur].
Since it understands the whole of itself, and nothing else together
with itself, its knowledge is equal to itself, nor does its understanding
derive from another nature."23
In other contexts, Augustine states that
every thing understood by us coengenders in us the knowledge of itself; the
knowledge is indeed begotten by both, by the understander and the under-
stood. Therefore when the mind knows itself, it is the only begetter of its
knowledge. It is at once understander and understood. It was knowable by
itself, even before it knew itself. But when it did not know itself, the
knowledge of itself was not in it. From the fact that it knows itself, then,
the mind generates a knowledge of itself equal to itself, since it does not
know itself less than what it is, nor is its knowledge another essence, not
only because it is the knower, but because it knows itself.24
What exactly does it mean to say that the mind, the knowing
that the soul is an intermingling of corporeal and incorporeal. It is said to be inter-
mediate because, in laying down what is sensible, it pervades and permeates it with
itself, without deflecting in any way from the unity of its being. "Remaining wholly in
itself, it is divided relatively to the bodies according to their own divisibility, because
they are not capable of receiving it in a unitary way. Therefore the division is an
affection of the bodies, not of the soul." (Enneads 4-2.1 [Henry and Schwyzer 2:6.73-
76]).
23. De Trin. 9.4-4 (CCL 50:297.19-23). The same concepts are illustrated at
greater length in 9.11.16. On the intermediate position of soul, see also 12.11.16.
The doctrine of the threefold relation or proportion between knower and known is a
constant of Neoplatonism. Ammonius of Hermias reiterates it in his commentary on
On Interpretation, very much under the influence of Proclus, but attributing it to "the
divine Iamblichus." He exemplifies the three possible cases of this relationship by
saying that (1) when the intellect knows what is particular in the events, referring it
to the universal, its knowledge is better than what is known; (2) when it turns to itself
and considers its own substance, the knowledge is of the same kind as what is known,
and therefore homogeneous with it; (3) when at last, ascending to the summit of its
own capacities, it considers the divine ordering of things, the knowledge is without
doubt inferior to what is known. See Ammonius, in De interp., ed. Busse (Berlin,
1897)135.14-32.
24. De Trin. 19.12.18 (CCL 50:309.29-34).
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principle, does not descend below its own nature when knowing itself,
that it remains in knowledge equal to itself? If we compare this remark
to others already quoted, according to which nothing can be more
present to the mind than the mind itself, we may be tempted to
conclude that the mind has a knowledge totally exhaustive of itself, so
clear and distinct as not to leave blind spots or uncertainties, a knowl-
edge that possesses itself immediately and totally, that is transparent
to itself, a full revelation of itself to itself The first and most obvious
answer to this superficial reading of Augustine is that, if this were so,
the mind would be God or equal to God-
Of course, some crucial points of Augustine's speculative thought
might be adduced in support of such an interpretation- There is, for
instance, the radical transcendence of mind over body, with the corol-
lary that mind is thus necessarily "impermeable" to body. This is the
principle that Etienne Gilson calls the "inferiority of thought-" He
explains it in these terms: "Since everything comes to the mind from
within, nothing antecedent can be given to it: the mind is therefore
its own first object- At the same time, the mind finds in the act by
which it immediately takes hold of itself an invincible certainty, the
warrant for the possibility of a certainty in general- It is then a princi-
pal characteristic of metaphysical Augustinianism that the evidence
through which the mind apprehends itself is the first of all evidences
and the criterion of truth."2 5
Apart from the fact that the first evidence and criterion of truth do
not depend for Augustine on a subjective fact but on the truth's
manifestation and illumination within the mind,26 it can rightly be
objected to Gilson that everything depends on how the act of the
mind's self-apprehension is conceived. Is it simultaneously an intellec-
tual and vital act (as we have tried to show), that is, a perception of real
existence in which being, life, and thought are so intimately united as
to mirror in a mysterious, but true, manner the unity-in-distinct ion of
25. Etienne Gilson, Introduction ά Vetude de saint Augμstin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1949),
p. 321.
26. It is not out of place to recall De vera relig. 39.72—73, one of the profoundest
passages in the whole Augustinian corpus. The truth of which Augustine speaks is
"summa et intima" (De vera relig. 20.38 [CCL 32:210.2]). It is neither a creature nor a
projection of consciousness, but an objective reality established and shone forth by
the sovereign being (compare Confess. 8.10.16).
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the Trinity?27 Or is this act to be conceived as a "pure" thought, in
which the quality of thought logically and really precedes being?
It seems that this second reading has been adopted by Gilson on the
grounds of a historiographical assumption that sees a historical and
theoretical continuity from Augustine to the various Augustinianisms
that have flourished so abundantly in modern thought, especially near
its beginnings,28 But what Augustine really says in the passages quoted
above, as in others that could be brought forward, in no way permits
a Cartesian or subjectivist reading. Augustine only maintains that,
when the mind knows itself, its knowledge is on a par with its self—
namely, is endowed with a nature and a dignity at the level of the
mind's own being.
We must not forget that the mind's operations are consubstantial
with itself, given its incorporeal nature. In Augustine's own words,
"These things subsist in the soul and somehow unfold, having been
enfolded, so that they are now perceived and enumerated substantially
or, so to speak, essentially."29 The knowledge that the mind has of
itself is thus an actualization of its own substance. The preceding
thesis, that the mind's self-knowledge is at the level of its nature and
essence, must be construed in the context of this second statement.
The mind becomes equal to itself in knowing itself. This does not
mean that it knows its own metaphysical substance as if it were one of
27. On this suggestive theme, which confirms Augustine's friendly adherence to
the realistic tradition of ancient philosophy, see, for example, De Trin. 9.5.8. It
follows that thought (a substance of its own kind) is melted into substantial unity with
being and love. That thought is substantially united to being in the distinction of the
relative "persons" (if we can adapt theological language to a philosophical theme) is a
principle not to be found in Descartes nor in many other modern thinkers. According
to Augustine, being is on par with thought and love (as conversely) in the created
trinity that forms the human soul. This Augustinian thesis might be considered
subordinate and instrumental to his theological reflection on the Trinity. But it is
better to consider it as a philosophical principle pleno jure that meets a theological
position, correlated if independent.
28. On the very page quoted above, Gilson states that the metaphysical principle
of the transcendence of the soul over the body has given origin to a whole series of
strictly connected theses: "[They] will seldom dissociate in the course of history, and
[their] necessary connection will not appear anywhere with greater evidence than in
the doctrines of Descartes or Malbranche" (Introduction ά Vetude de saint Augustin,
p. 321).
29. De Tήn. 9.4.5 (CCL 50:297.28-298.30).
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the objects that constitute the formal world of thought and experi-
ence. Augustine insists many times on this point, and with good
reason.
The knowledge that the mind has of itself is completely sui
generis. It belongs to an anomolous dimension outside the usual
modes of knowledge. Speaking loosely, we can say that the mind
"feels" itself—though the expression is inaccurate, not only because
we are here dealing with what eludes any strict specification, but also
because "feeling" must not be interpreted as connected to corporeality
or sensibility. The "feeling" is general; it is specified in several funda-
mental ways. The mind in fact perceives itself as existing, living,
thinking, and loving. It knows itself, not in its own objective nature
or essence (which would require an external observer endowed with
some higher and more comprehensive nature than the mind itself
has), but rather in its states and operations, while and so far as it
exercises acts of being, living, thinking, loving. The mind takes hold
of itself at the very roots of its own being, and it does so dynamically,
not statically.
The mind's perception of itself in its own interior activity cannot be
said to have only a pragmatic meaning, as if one could not look
beyond the operations and the being that grounds them to some dimly
seen metaphysical level.30 Augustine often repeats that the mind has
a kind of vision (conspectus) of itself—an inward and nonsensible
vision, of course. The metaphor should not be understood literally.
Augustine wants to say that, as eyes see an object, so the mind sees
itself as if "in front of itself" (in conspectu)—not as an object, but as
being identical with itself. It does not have to go out of itself in order
to know itself but need only stay within itself. Staying in itself, it turns
towards itself with a "movement" (conversio) made possible by its
incorporeal nature. It must be said, of course, that these descriptive
terms suggest spatial states and interactions and so are unfaithful to
the reality that they attempt to describe.
A being that is free from bodiliness does not stay in itself strictly
30. This simple description of internal states and the structures of self-
consciousness does not yet imply any particular theory about the souΓs nature or,
alternately, about the meaninglessness of the concept "nature" and its replacement
by a concept of disposition to action. Existential perception and natural self-
consciousness are, not theories, but original inner realities, preceding, and having
priority over, every possible theory.
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speaking (that is, physically speaking), nor does it put itself into its
own presence, or see itself, or turn towards itself The mind has no
parts, and cannot double itself into an "in-itself" and an "out-of-
itself" These and other spatial images are used only to suggest that
spiritual realities have the capacity to see themselves without medi-
ation, that is, to come into direct cognitive contact with themselves,
to apprehend and perceive themselves. But this assertion must not be
understood to mean that these realities, whatever they are, are able
fully to realize their own substances. Divine nature, whose intimate
knowledge coincides with its own substance, and in which there is no
discrepancy between being, knowing, living, loving, or any other
essential determination, is obviously quite different from the human
mind, which is a creature, however much it is also a spiritual one.
We have said that the mind does not know "what" it is as a reality,
but knows itself as a principle of activity or actuality before and be-
yond the circuit of objective knowledge, in an intimacy rich with
meanings but void of restricted connotations. Being, living, knowing,
loving are qualifications to the mind's original perception of itself and
so are the authentic roots of human being. As such, and at the same
time, they are also the highest perspectives upon reality, within the
frame of which objects and their relations appear to the mind. The
mind's knowledge of itself is indeed only formal, because it does not
display objective contents that would constitute it as such and make
its substance accessible.
If we want to say that the original and founding consciousness has
contents, let us say (with an appropriate oxymoron) that they are
subjective contents, inner determinations of the subject that identify
themselves with the subjective principle as knowing and perceiving
itself. The mind's self-knowledge is not inferior to objectifying knowl-
edge, as if in lacking objects it lacked something essential. As the very
moment of the foundation and opening of consciousness's horizon,
self-knowledge is prior to the world and so different from it.
If we wish to understand more exactly the speculative potential of
this Augustinian teaching, we must read it in its natural connection
with reflection on the Trinitarian mysteries. This reflection suggests
an analogical similarity between the structural elements of the mind,
which appear in the acts of its self-perception,31 and what Christian
31. Augustine enumerates various "created trinities" that exemplify this likeness,
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revelation tells us about the mystery of the Trinity, one God in three
consubstantial persons. The analogy is real. It does not derive from
forced assimilations or fictitious convergences, but from natural refer-
ences and consonances between the two parallel lines of investigation
that reciprocally confirm each other.
The mind's insight first meets itself—not as an intelligible object,
but as an opaque, indecipherable mirror of itself that perceives more
than it knows and knows by perceiving. In turning toward itself and
reflecting upon itself, the mind discovers that its own substance is
interwoven with essential orders rooted in itself—indeed, identical
with itself. Its interior space, void of objects, is vivified from within by
the merging of these articulations of its own consciousness. The mind
is conscious of itself so far as it perceives existing, thinking, loving.
These forms of perception or apperception qualify the consciousness in
its inner reality as identical with and constitutive of it, not as elements
joining it from without. The mind is one, but it is also modulated in
its unity by figures that define its essential virtualities. Aristotle re-
marks of the mind's nature, "If its own form is made manifest alongside
another, what is inside will hinder and intercept it."32 For example, if
there were a color inside the eye's pupil, that internal color would
impede the perception of external ones, because the only color to be
perceived would be that internal to the eye. If the mind, similarly,
should participate in the nature of any of the substances that it knows,
this participated nature, being internal to the mind, would prevent it
from knowing any other thing.
Turning the Aristotelian thesis upside down, we might say that it is
what is inside the mind that coincides with its own essence, charac-
terizing it and making possible its self-manifestation. The mind can set
itself as principle, and understand itself as such, so far as its inside is
not empty or undifferentiated but, rather, is framed according to forms
with an individuality of their own. Of course, the forms cannot be
thought to have the status of objects, and consequently to be in need
of definition according to categorical schemes. They are, in fact,
precategorical. And even so (or perhaps just for that reason), they
under different points of view and as ordered to different speculative requirements.
See the very precise inventory in De Trinitate, vol. 1, Bibliotheque Augustinienne 15
(Bruges and Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1955), p. 571.
32. Aristotle On the Soul 3.4.429a20-21.
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really do distinguish the mind as it is in itself, just as they also con-
stitute it.
In this way, the vision of the inner eye, glimpsing itself, also
glimpses in itself these metaphysical powers. Its communion in them
discloses the setting for its reality. This reality, on the other hand, is
wholly present in every one of the principles as well as in their total-
ity, because none of them subsists in and for itself, in isolation from
that fullness, but in and for it, as it subsists in and for them. For these
consubstantial principles of the mind, the name "transcendentals"
may perhaps be proposed.33 Their function and ontological stature are
indeed analogous to the familiar transcendentals of being, one, truth,
goodness, and beauty. Coessential to the mind, these new transcen-
dentals form its very substance. In the personal subsistence of the
mind's transcendentals, in their reciprocal implication and inherence
within the common substance that is present in all and unifies every-
thing in itself, the mysterious image of the Trinity shows itself in the
human mind.
Augustine says, "When the soul knows and loves itself, the trinity
of soul, love, and knowledge remains. And these are not confused by
commingling, although each one is in itself, and all are mutually in
all, and each one in the other two, and two in one. Therefore, 'all in
all/" 3 4 In this flowing spiritual life, "the mind loves and knows all of
itself, and knows all its love, and loves all its knowledge, when these
three are perfect in relation to themselves. In an admirable way, the
three are inseparable from each other, and yet each one of them,
considered in itself, is substance, and all together one substance or
essence, when they are said in relation to each other."3 5
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33. On the role of the transcendentals in our always obscure and imperfect com-
prehension of the mysteries of the Trinity, see the important paper by Norman
Kretzmann, "Trinity and Transcendentals," in Tήnity, Incarnation, and Atonement,
edited by Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1989).
34. De Tήn. 9.5.8 (CCL 50:300.1-5), with the allusion to 1 Cor. 15.28.
35. De Tήn. 9.5.8 (CCL 50:301.26-31). This passage and the one just quoted are
taken from the beginning and end of the chapter, but the whole text that they
enclose—not to say, its context in the whole book—must be kept in mind in order to
understand what Augustine will teach about the created unity/trinity of soul, knowl-
edge, and love in the human person.
